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In 1971, having absolutely no experience with or knowledge about the 
economics of health care, I became the deputy assistant secretary for 
health policy at what was then the U.S. Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare. To this position, I brought a strong belief in the free 
market, having trained at a University of Chicago farm school, UCLA. 
Many of you know that there were no such things as health economists 
back then. So, being almost as arrogant as a surgeon, I thought: Why 
shouldn’t an economist be in charge of American health care policy? But 
as you will see as my presentation progresses, I no longer believe that pri-
vate market forces alone can really help to improve coverage and lower 
the rising trend in health care spending. 
In August of 1971, Richard Nixon, our conservative Republican presi-
dent, imposed wage and price controls on the American economy. I was 
then asked to come to the White House and explain why health care 
spending was growing so rapidly. All the president’s men were there. Herb 
Stein, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, turned to me 
and said, “Dr. Altman, do you know how much money we’re spending 
on health care?” And before I had a chance to say anything, he said, “We 
are spending 7.5 percent of our gross national product on health care, 
and if it reaches 8 percent our whole way of life is going to deteriorate.” 
Stein said, “It’s going to be your job to make sure that doesn’t happen.” 
Clearly, the growth in health care costs did not stop at 8 percent of GDP, 
and we are still being told that if we don’t stop the growth in spending, 
our health care system could collapse. My current thinking on this matter 
reﬂects my being a two-handed economist.
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On the one hand, I listened to Gene Steuerle, I listened to all the num-
bers mentioned at this conference, and I heard many of you say that the 
level of spending for health care in general, and for Medicare in particu-
lar, cannot keep going up. It is just too high! On the other hand, I keep 
looking at the rate of growth that we have had over these last 30 years, 
and I respond with two observations. One, health care costs just keep 
going up; and two, our American way of life has not totally deteriorated. 
Of course, maybe in the future it will be different.
In theory I agree, as some of you argue, that there are things that we 
can do. But the reality is also what we have discussed: Do we have the 
political will to do these things? And if you look over the decades since 
the mid-1960s, you will see that we had two periods when we did lower 
the rate of growth in health care spending. One was in the 1970s, when 
we regulated the growth in health care spending. We peppered the coun-
try with planning agencies, and we put in place several forms of price 
controls and supply constraints, and these changes did slow the rate of 
growth in spending, at least for a while.
I am sure many of you would say that it was inevitable that health 
care spending would resume its upward growth and return to its normal 
pattern. And, in fact, that is surely what happened in the 1980s. Well, 
it may or may not have been inevitable, but our political will was such 
that we could not, or would not, support those whom we asked to keep 
spending under control. And, by the way, for those of you who do not 
remember history, it was the Democrats who took the power away from 
the Nixon administration in 1974 to control wages and prices. By that 
time, the administration had limited the wage and price control system to 
only limit health care spending.
The reason the Democrats took it away was that they were concerned 
that the Nixon administration was primarily regulating the wages paid to 
health care workers and not the prices paid by patients or insurance com-
panies. But, be that as it may, the reality was that when the United States 
entered the 1980s, we had what I call halfway competitive markets and 
ineffective regulation in the health care sector. “Katie, bar the door!”—
you could spend anything and get anything you wanted—the actual 
growth rate of health care spending in the 1980s was really phenom-
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the use of managed care, particularly by private companies that were try-
ing to slow the growth in their health insurance premiums. Some people, 
particularly health providers and patients, called it “damaged care,” but 
the reality is that managed care did exactly what we wanted it to do. 
It lowered the rate of growth of spending to the rate of growth in our 
national income, and generated a zero rate of growth in health insurance 
premiums. And then, we said we did not want what we had asked for. 
Whose stupid idea was this in the ﬁrst place? Anybody who was in man-
aged care was immediately shot and they were gone. Now they are again 
called insurance executives.
By the end of the 1990s, these same insurance companies said, “Why 
should we regulate health care use or prices? No one else wants us to 
regulate. We will just raise premiums.” And so, now we are back to the 
1980s’ situation of escalating health care costs, and premiums have been 
growing at close to double-digit rates since 2000. So, the question today, 
in the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, is: Can we or do we have 
the political will to introduce something to stem the tide of these rising 
costs? If we don’t make some major changes in the system, there is no 
question that we are going to see a continuation of the current trend in 
escalating healthcare spending—for some very good and for some not-so-
good reasons that we have heard about in other sessions. Having better 
medical technology to improve health status and having an aging popula-
tion are both good reasons to spend more on health care.
What is not so good (or at least is harder to justify) is that we have 
surprisingly little information to help patients and health professionals 
decide what types of treatments really beneﬁt patients. Additionally, it 
is against the law for any federal agency to take the cost of care into 
account when deciding whether to approve a new drug or medical pro-
cedure. The work of the group under Dr. Jack Wennberg at Dartmouth 
Medical School has demonstrated repeatedly that, as a result, the United 
States wastes billions of dollars each year for care that is worthless or 
close to worthless.1
Where is all of this increased spending going to lead us? Well, you 
have heard the numbers. Health care expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP ﬂattened out in the 1990s. But since 2000, health care spending has 
been growing rapidly; and today, it is over 16 percent. According to the 
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most recent estimates, the growth in health care spending will continue 
to exceed the growth in the national income; and by 2014, it is likely to 
reach 18 percent of GDP.
Somebody said that we in the United States should never compare 
ourselves with other countries in the world. However, there is a lot of 
discussion about how much more we spend on health care than any 
other country, even in comparison with our higher GDP. But we are very 
sophisticated in rationalizing this disparity. It has been argued that sim-
ply comparing the share of GDP devoted to health care in each country 
is not the right way to analyze international differences. We should rec-
ognize that health care is a positive good; and, therefore, it is appropriate 
that as a country’s GDP grows, it should spend a greater proportion of its 
income on health care. But even when you correlate per capita spending 
on health care and per capita GDP, as shown in Figure 7.1, the United 
States is still spending substantially more than the rate that would corre-
late with our per capita income. In other words, we would have to reduce 
our spending by over 30 percent in order to be similar to other industrial-
ized countries in terms of per capita spending on health care. 
Figure 7.1
International Comparison of per Capita Spending: Health Care versus GDP
Source: OECD, 2002.
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What is fascinating about this international comparison is that other 
countries are using exactly the same language about their health care 
systems that we are using about ours. I cannot go to another country—
for example, Australia, Germany, France, or South Africa—where they 
do not claim that they are spending too much money on health care. 
If you look at Germany in comparison with that line, they are about 
as high above it as we are. Of course, they are at a different point. So, 
there is something we can learn from other countries. It is that we are 
all messed up. And for very good reason: the pressure to want more 
exists in all countries. The sobering difference between the United 
States and most other countries is that their health care spending rates 
include full coverage for all their citizens. In contrast, about 16 per-
cent of the American population under age 65 still has no health care 
coverage—which is not what one would expect in the world’s richest   
nation.
Everyone at the conference has raised the issue of whether the United 
States will be willing to continue to increase the proportion of its national 
output spent on health care. While I agree with David Cutler—that we are 
not going to cut back substantially on health care spending in the United 
States—I do believe that it will be imperative to control the growth of 
these costs in the future. This will necessitate some changes to the current 
delivery system. 
I happen to be a believer in the employer-based health insurance sys-
tem, with all of its warts. It is a uniquely American system, complex as 
it is, and one with roots in the free market. In my mind, the only viable 
alternative to an employer-based system is a single-payer system. All of 
the other ideas for developing universal health care coverage—such as 
reversible tax credits, or a mandate that all individuals purchase private 
coverage, or a federal subsidy combined with a voluntary system—sound 
nice, but these solutions could ultimately lead to an increase in the num-
ber of uninsured Americans. The reason is that we will not be willing to 
raise taxes enough to substitute for the loss of the employer contribu-
tions, thus leaving individuals to buy insurance in the private market 
with no, or little, government subsidy. We would also lose the employer-
based system’s advantages of administrative efﬁciency and beneﬁts pool-
ing. Of course, in theory there are ways to ﬁx the problems involved in 
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providing universal coverage, but I think that as a practical matter, we as 
a nation would not surmount these difﬁculties.
So, I believe that the United States can and should build upon the exist-
ing combination of employer-based health insurance for working Ameri-
cans, and should also expand the Medicaid program for the poor, as 
well as the Medicare system for our older population. I would not be 
against lowering the age of eligibility for Medicare coverage to those 
aged 60 years and older. For those people who are not working, this 
change would have major beneﬁts, and it would help to lower the cost 
of health insurance for employers that provide coverage. An enhanced 
combination of the employer-based system and government health care 
programs could result in the United States’ effectively having universal 
coverage for all Americans. Unfortunately, our current employer-based 
private insurance system is cracking badly. You can look at the num-
bers between 2000 and 2005: the percentage of working Americans with 
employer-provided health care coverage has fallen from 65 percent to 59 
percent. Were it not for the growth in Medicaid, the number of uninsured 
Americans would have increased even further. Thank you, Alan Weil, for 
caring about this issue. It is a particularly serious problem when you see 
that for small ﬁrms, the drop in coverage was even much higher. 
We may well develop something that is a cross between a single-payer 
system and an employer-based system; but to really bring about health 
care coverage for everyone in the United States, we must make participa-
tion in the system mandatory. I have suggested having the federal gov-
ernment help to lower employer-based insurance premiums, by helping 
to pay for the most expensive patients with a high case cost reinsurance 
system. If we do not help the employer-based system by lowering pre-
miums soon, we could see it just disintegrate. Look at what is going on 
at General Motors and the other auto makers. The CEOs from all the 
U.S. automobile manufacturers took the unprecedented step of going to 
see President George W. Bush and asking for federal help in paying for 
the health insurance costs of auto workers. Ironically, instead of helping 
them, in his 2007 State of the Union address President Bush suggested 
that workers at companies like General Motors who have very good 
health insurance coverage should pay an extra tax. Bush’s proposal, in 
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What is going to happen if the employer-based system continues to 
deteriorate and, as a result, the number of uninsured Americans increases 
substantially? If these newly uninsured workers need health care, either 
they will become part of the uncompensated cost system that is indi-
rectly supported by a hidden tax on those of us who are insured, or 
they will join the rolls of those covered by government through the   
Medicaid program. If the latter happens, how will we pay for this 
expanded program? There are some in the economics community who 
believe that we cannot raise government taxes. It seems to have become 
the equivalent of the eleventh commandment: God decreed that the tax 
rate ceiling in the United States cannot be more than 18 percent or 19 
percent of its national income. I have been looking for that eleventh 
commandment in the scriptures. I have not found it yet. But given the 
verve with which I hear such assertions, it must exist somewhere. I will 
keep looking. I must admit that I do not believe in the eleventh com-
mandment nor do I think that most Americans do either. At the end of 
the day, when Americans are asked, “Do you want to maintain Social 
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid in their present form, or see them 
forced to stay within existing revenue (tax rate) constraints?” I believe 
this country will support raising taxes. But Americans will also ques-
tion whether all the procedures and services we now, or will, provide are   
truly necessary. 
With that said, I do believe that in the future we will have a problem 
ﬁnancing our governmental programs, and, yes, we will need to make 
changes in these programs that will both rein in spending to some extent 
and ask wealthier seniors to pay more for their coverage. But I also 
believe that we will ﬁnd new money to help sustain the overall mission 
of these programs. Some believe we can solve our Medicare ﬁnancing 
problem by raising the age of eligibility (currently, persons aged 65 years 
and older are eligible). I am afraid this change will not save the program 
much money, and will add more problems for those people who retire at 
age 65 and are no longer covered by employer-provided private insur-
ance. Fortunately, most 65-year-old Americans are relatively healthy. 
Hence, unlike delaying Social Security beneﬁts, eliminating three or even 
ﬁve years of Medicare coverage will not yield commensurate beneﬁts in 
terms of cost savings. For the sake of argument, if you want to save the   
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Medicare program money, eliminate eligibility for those individuals 
between the ages of 75 and 80. (I do not endorse this solution.)
We now require seniors with individual incomes over $80,000 to pay 
more for Medicare Part B (physician and other outpatient care) coverage. 
While this new policy requirement does add some additional funds to the 
Medicare pool, do not count on it to solve the program’s long-run ﬁscal 
problems. Nor is there enough “gold in them thar hills” to solve all of 
Medicare’s future ﬁnancial problems. While there clearly are a number of 
senior citizens with substantial wealth, the average per capita income of 
Americans over age 65 is less than $30,000.
Since Medicare began in 1966, the federal government has avoided 
placing signiﬁcant restrictions on government payments for health care; 
to a lesser extent, this is also true for Medicaid. But as the escalating 
trend in health care costs continues and a larger share of the population 
becomes eligible for Medicare, I think this will change. These restric-
tions on government payment and use will have a growing impact on 
our health system, since, sometime around 2010 when the baby boomers 
start to retire, more than 50 percent of all health care spending in the 
United States will come from state and federal governments. This will 
be true even if there are no further expansions in these programs. What 
impact will our allocating a larger share of public funds to health care 
spending have on the health care delivery system?
To begin addressing this question, let me change the subject a bit and 
focus on the potential long-term impact of technology on health care 
spending. The key question in my mind is, what will be the inﬂuence of 
technological change on the health care demands of the baby boomers? 
When I started calling the boomers “the Bill Clinton generation” a few 
years ago, I did not realize that I was putting a hex on him and that he 
would wind up having open-heart surgery so quickly. But Clinton is my 
model of the impact that technology will have on the baby boomers’ 
health care spending. 
So what are the baby boomers going to want as they reach retire-
ment age and become eligible for Medicare? Are the new technological 
advances going to result in cumulative cost increases in the way that previ-
ous advances have done, or is technology going to result in more effective 
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We have seen a lot of what we call “cumulative medical technologies” 
building on top of one another, as opposed to putting a greater emphasis 
upon effective technologies that limit spending. It is not clear whether 
prices have gone down for these newer technologies, but the quantity 
surely has gone up. Paul Ginsberg wrote about this issue a couple of 
years ago (Strunk and Ginsberg 2002), and since then we have had an 
ongoing discussion. Ginsberg believes that during old age, the boomer   
generation will not use that much more health care than it does now; 
rather, it is going to be a healthier generation in its elder years than   
previous generations and one that will therefore need less care. Perhaps 
the average baby boomer is going to live to, say 85, then ﬁnd a nice   
comfortable place and cease to exist, costing the Medicare program   
nothing.
Maybe this prognosis is correct. But a few years ago, my colleague 
David Shactman and I played around with some numbers. We looked at 
the spending pattern on health care by age cohort from 1987 to 1997—at 
that point the baby boomers were between 31 and 50 years old—and we 
found that, aside from the neonates, the fastest spending growth among 
the different age groups was among the boomer age group, particularly 
when you add in spending on prescription drugs.
Among the boomer generation, by far the fastest-growing expenditure 
category is prescription drugs. It is not the highest one, but it is growing 
the most rapidly. There is a reason why the drug companies make sure 
that many of their commercials are aimed right at the baby boomer gen-
eration. The reality is that the boomers are big spenders, and I see noth-
ing that is going to stop this trend as they enter their golden years.
It is now well known and supported by most analysts that hospitals 
“cost-shift” to other payers when the government reimburses them for 
less than the costs they incur or when they provide free care to the unin-
sured. Maybe this is not a dollar-for-dollar adjustment, but wherever 
possible, they do shift a substantial proportion of the costs that are not 
fully reimbursed. You can see this relationship in Figure 7.2. If you look 
back to the early 1990s, the average private payment-to-cost ratio in 
hospitals was about 130 percent. 
In other words, privately insured patients were being charged 30   
percent more than the cost of their own care, while at the same time 
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hospitals were losing between 10 and 20 percent when treating Medi-
care and Medicaid patients. As we moved into the mid-1990s, all this 
changed. Medicare and Medicaid payment-to-cost ratios rose while the 
ratios for private insurance groups fell. I remember hearing all of the 
managed care industry’s bravado about how successful they were in beat-
ing up on hospitals. Little did these cheerleaders know that the hospitals 
were not as concerned about receiving lower payments from the man-
aged care industry, because Medicare and Medicaid were actually paying 
pretty well at the time. But that halcyon era ended after Congress passed 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. After 1999, we were back to a period 
where government payments became low relative to the cost of providing 
care, and hospitals worked hard to extract higher payments from their 
privately insured patients. As a result, the private payers’ payment-to-
cost ratio has risen in the last couple of years from 112 percent to around 
120 percent (see Figure 7.2). 
Given that the future proportion of hospital patient expenses incurred 
by Medicare recipients will be higher because of the demographic trends 
we have been discussing, suppose hospitals want to maintain the same 
margins in 2025 as they earned in 2003. What would the privately 
Figure 7.2
Hospital Payment-to-Cost Ratios
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insured payment-to-cost ratio have to be in 2025? Of course, this is a 
hypothetical exercise, but I think it highlights the ﬁnancial pressures that 
hospitals and private insurance companies will face in the future. Stated 
differently, in order for the hospitals of 2025 to maintain their margins, 
given their future cost structure and the changing demographics of their 
patient mix, private hospital payments relative to costs will have to rise 
to unprecedented levels. If this does not happen, there will have to be big 
changes in the way hospitals do business or a signiﬁcant reduction in the 
utilization of hospital care by all patients, particularly those covered by 
government programs.
Other countries have restricted their growth in health care spending. 
How have they done it? It does not just happen. The way they do it is by 
keeping people from getting access to expensive medical technology that 
has limited beneﬁts. But not everyone believes that making medical deci-
sions based strictly on the cost-beneﬁt ratio is a good thing. What about 
the elderly patient who could live a few years longer, but would need a 
very expensive procedure to do so? I will want access to that technology 
when I need it. I believe the baby boomers will want it as well.
In the United States, we have this pressure to provide and pay for the 
health care gold standard, which means doing everything you can for a 
patient, regardless of whether the beneﬁts are at all commensurate with 
the cost of the treatment. That is what health care providers are trained 
to do, what patients expect, and what the present system has paid for 
providing. In fact, there is growing evidence that in some parts of the 
country the situation is even worse—the health system is providing care 
that is actually harmful, and we’re doing too much. Dr. Jack Wennberg 
at Dartmouth Medical School has been studying this issue for over 20 
years; you can review his ﬁndings, so I won’t belabor the point, except to 
suggest that there must be a happy medium between a strict cost-beneﬁt 
system of rationing health care and a system that spares no expense and 
covers every possible procedure. 
But we cannot adopt the purely market-oriented solution of opting for 
insurance policies with very high co-payments and limits on coverage. 
If we do this, there will be some winners but also some big losers. Who 
would be the winners? Clearly, healthy individuals: they will pay lower 
prices. Adopting the purely market-oriented solution would also help 
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those owners and workers who either operate truly efﬁcient health care 
institutions or who “cherry-pick” only the most proﬁtable patients.
Who would be the losers? Sick patients who have complex illnesses. 
No provider or insurer wants expensive patients who incur costs that are 
higher than their covered payments—such as burn patients, psychiatric 
cases, or chronic medical conditions. The uninsured would lose out, as 
well as Medicaid recipients and long-term workers in big, expensive sys-
tems. Finally, the many public health services provided to communities at 
no cost, or at prices below cost, would be hurt. A purely market-oriented 
solution might be efﬁcient, but it would not be equitable. Americans are 
increasingly aware that the current system is approaching the breaking 
point, and the issue of how to deal with health care promises to ﬁgure 
into the 2008 presidential election.
So then, the real question must be: Are there market alternatives to 
this unpalatable scenario of greater demand and higher costs? I say that 
the answer is yes. There are four distinctly private-sector forces that 
could help to reduce private spending levels and keep the United States’ 
employer-based health insurance system from breaking. As I said previ-
ously, I believe that if we abandon employer-based insurance, we will face 
a serious coverage and ﬁnancing problem, followed by the implementa-
tion of some form of a single-payer system that, I suspect, would provide 
lower-quality health care services. From my point of view, I would rather 
not see this country move in that direction. Therefore, I think we need to 
make the employer-based system work by: (1) changing the design of the 
employer-based insurance system to encourage greater consumer involve-
ment in managing costs, (2) returning to a true “managed care” system, 
(3) altering provider payments to reward efﬁciently provided care by pay-
ing for performance, and (4) creating an effective, systemwide, high-cost 
disease management system. We need to change the design of employer-
based insurance and incorporate greater consumer involvement. Whether 
we call these measures health savings accounts, high deductibles, or co-
insurance, the forces will have a positive impact on improving the coun-
try’s current health care system.
In my view, we need to return to managed care. We ought to believe 
in managing health care in order to manage health care costs. The real-
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not just cut payments without due regard to the value of the services 
provided. We should be paying health care providers for performance, 
not just paying them, period. Incentives matter. Finally, we can pursue 
Willy Sutton’s idea—he was the bank robber who said to go where the 
money is. We can stop concentrating on saving nickels and dimes and 
see whether we can better control the spending for those patients who 
cost the system the most—the very sick. Saving money by controlling the 
cost of caring for the very sick is one way to avoid breaking the bank by 
allowing health care costs to spiral out of control.
But, at the end of the day, I am with Mark Pauly. Private-sector solu-
tions are all good things, but they are not going to fundamentally change 
the long-term cost curves of providing health care in the United States, 
especially as the baby boom generation enters old age. Private-sector 
solutions are just not strong enough to trigger meaningful incentives to 
contain rising costs. This brings us full circle to my opening point: I no 
longer believe that private market forces alone will sufﬁce to improve 
health care coverage and contain the rising trend of greater costs, but 
they can be helpful. In the end, we also need government to help guide 
the system to become more effective, by providing the information nec-
essary to help patients and providers know which services do and don’t 
work. We also need government to stop paying for services that really 
have little or no beneﬁt.
At some point, we must introduce more aggressive changes in utili-
zation that bring both providers and government into the action. We 
cannot just rely on forcing patients to bear more and more of the cost 
of their care. Making these changes will not be easy, and right now I do 
not see that the United States has the political will to seriously confront 
such changes. Health care promises to be a topic in the 2008 presidential 
election, but the difference between debating an issue and taking concrete 
action is considerable. Nor, at present, do I see a broad willingness on the 
part of business or government to eliminate coverage. Therefore, at least 
in the short term, I see spending and medical care premiums continuing 
to grow at rates signiﬁcantly faster than the growth in GDP. Government 
may try to slow its spending on medical services, but it, too, is being 
pulled along by the public will to provide health care at all costs, not to 
curtail its provision. 
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Americans care about equity, and I believe that they will support higher 
spending if they feel that the money is well spent. But sooner rather than 
later, we need to have a serious national debate about how the private 
sector and the public sector can balance the cost of providing health care 
for everyone in the United States. This is a worthy goal for our nation, 
both economically and politically. I believe that there are efﬁcient and 
equitable solutions if we have the will to confront the health care chal-
lenge of providing high-quality medical care while controlling costs. 
Notes
1.  See the work of the Center for the Evaluative Clinical Sciences at http://www.
dartmouth.edu/~cecs/. Accessed October 9, 2007.
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Stuart Altman has laid out a full range of concerns about rising health 
care costs. I will focus my comments on the tie of health care costs to 
health care access—or, to be more precise—to health insurance coverage. 
My argument, in brief, is that, although uninsurance does not begin with 
health care costs, cost increases undermine the capacity or willingness of 
our public and private ﬁnancial institutions to assure access to coverage; 
and, that (like it or not), deterioration in private and public coverage 
actually constitutes a cost containment strategy—one of growing ineq-
uity between haves and have-nots. The argument has ﬁve points.
The ﬁrst point is to remind us that the primary barrier to health insur-
ance coverage is not costs; it’s income. An estimated one-half to two-
thirds of the uninsured (depending on how we measure income) have 
incomes below twice the federal poverty level. The uninsured are in low-
wage, low-beneﬁt jobs, most of which do not offer health insurance; and 
the direct price they face for health insurance policies in the nongroup 
market—in conjunction with these policies’ limited beneﬁts—exceeds 
their willingness or, in my view, their ability to pay. That means that it is 
subsidies, not cost containment, that are needed to expand coverage.
That takes me to my second point: that cost increases for the insured 
have, for decades, been a major political barrier to providing subsidies. 
• Supporters believed Medicare to be the ﬁrst step toward national 
health insurance; but early after its passage, forward movement was 
derailed, not only by partisan politics, but also by Medicare’s rapid cost 
increases.
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• The Carter administration, ostensibly committed to universal cover-
age, put cost containment ﬁrst. They never got that, and they never got 
to coverage.
• The Clinton administration tried to ﬁnance coverage with cost con-
tainment, and they, too, got neither.
Essentially, over about the last 50 years, the uninsured minority have 
been held hostage to our unwillingness or inability to slow cost growth 
for the already-insured majority.
Point three: Cost growth is increasing the numbers of people without 
health insurance and eroding the beneﬁts (or consuming the wages) of 
many of the insured. Although income is the primary barrier to insur-
ance coverage for modest-income people, at the margin, higher health 
care costs (especially in a weak labor market) mean fewer people covered 
and, for those who are covered, fewer beneﬁts or lower wages, as health 
care costs consume a growing share of compensation. That means we 
have a problem not only with the sustainability, but also with the regres-
sivity of our current health ﬁnancing mechanisms. And, whether through 
deterioration in beneﬁts or in disposable income, it means we have a de 
facto strategy for dealing with costs: increasing inequity between high- 
and low-income people.
Point four: There is a powerful likelihood that this de facto strategy 
will become de jure. Concern about health care costs in the political 
arena is largely framed as a problem with our “entitlement” programs 
and deemed to create a need for “entitlement reform.” The target is not 
health care costs in general, nor is it our tax entitlements (most signiﬁ-
cantly the tax preference for employer-paid premiums); rather, it is our 
direct spending on Medicare and Medicaid. And the goal is not to reduce 
health care cost growth, but to cut public subsidies for these costs. Stuart 
raised Medicare ﬁnancing as the ﬁrst issue around which the Congress 
will confront this strategy, as general revenue contributions reach the 
Medicare Modernization Act’s newly created “cap.” But the strategy’s 
ﬁrst phase is to target Medicaid—the most politically vulnerable program, 
where, at the very moment of this conference, the nation’s governors are 
calling on Congress for “ﬂexibility” to increase cost sharing, cut ben-
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entitlement. Alongside cuts in private-sector protection may well come 
cuts in public-sector protection for the low-income pregnant women and 
children we have so far deemed deserving.
And that takes me to my ﬁfth and ﬁnal point—that in all likelihood, 
the “strategy” of increased inequity in response to increased costs will 
continue. The “haves” will get more; the “have-lesses” and the “have-
nots” will get less. And it will all happen without explicit consideration 
of what we, as a nation, can actually afford. As I have understood David 
Cutler and others (including participants in this conference), GDP growth 
can support a more equitable and even a growing health care system. We 
have policy choices, not immutable laws, about the share of that growth 
we wish to use for our collective good. And we can choose, like other 
nations, to promote efﬁciency and devote less to administrative costs, as 
well as use care more effectively to stretch those funds.
But the policy path we have followed obscures rather than facilitates 
explicit choices. Our public/private ﬁnancing system, which some have 
properly called “fragmented,” is not, as others have claimed, a “histori-
cal accident.” It is the outcome of a century’s worth of political choices 
and testimony to the stakes and values that reinforce and sustain them. 
Paths can change, but, at present, it certainly seems that our politics are 
entrenching, not reversing, the inequitable path we are on.The Need for Managed Incentives:  
Comments on Altman’s “Will the United 
States Continue to Allocate a Growing  
Proportion of Its GDP to Health Care?”
David O. Meltzer, M.D.
Dr. Altman asks whether and how the United States will contain its 
health care expenditures in future years. He argues that we will have no 
choice but to do so, and that a consumer-responsible system will likely 
play a major role in this transformation. He concludes with the remark 
that physicians will decide the shape and structure of this new system. As 
the physician among his discussants, I will respond to this last point and 
discuss examples, both positive and negative, of physician engagement 
in health care cost control efforts. I believe these show both the prom-
ise and challenge of physician leadership in this area. I will also discuss 
what I think is the failure to this point of physician engagement with 
patients around cost control, as I think this is a major concern with con-
sumer-driven models for controlling heath care costs that has received 
little attention. And ﬁnally, in discussing both of these issues of physician 
engagement in cost control efforts, I will try to suggest some ways in 
which I think health economics as a discipline has fallen short of realizing 
its promise to produce a more effective and efﬁcient health care system. 
Let me start by saying that I am not sure to what extent physicians 
will be leaders in this process. Surely, they will play an important role, 
but there are powerful forces, both economic and social, that may pre-
vent doctors from exercising the leadership one might have expected in 
a previous era. The immense economic burden of modern health care 
and the deteriorating professional authority of physicians are just two of 
these forces. But this said, let me touch on two areas where I think the 
involvement of physicians will be increasingly critical: hospital care and 
ambulatory care. In these two areas, one sees quite different patterns of 
physician awareness and involvement in the economics of health care. 
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As an economist, I think these are not random, but rather the results of 
the incentives we have created for doctors. In both cases, I think there 
is a clear lesson: doctors will follow the incentives they are given, but 
often not as quickly as we might hope they would. My key message will 
be that, as economists, we need to spend more time thinking about the 
things we can do along with incentives—for example, offering provider 
and patient education—to make incentives more effective. In short, we 
need to better manage incentives by understanding the organizational 
and human contexts in which they are applied. 
In hospital care, which Dr. Altman notes continues to be the largest 
single contributor to increases in health care costs, a remarkable trans-
formation is taking place in the United States. Speciﬁcally, hospital care is 
being taken over by a much smaller number of physicians than previously 
practiced in this setting—a group of physicians who are more focused 
on containing costs than were those they are replacing. One sees this 
most dramatically in internal medicine, where a new group of specialists 
called “hospitalists” have taken over more than one-third of all hospital 
general medical care in the United States only seven years after the term 
“hospitalist” was deﬁned. Although the data are not unequivocal, there 
are suggestions that replacing traditional internists focused on ambula-
tory care with hospitalists can reduce the cost of hospital care by about 
10 percent, while maintaining or improving outcomes. Furthermore, our 
data suggest that hospitalists are doing this while providing care that is 
technically better. For example, in the care of community-acquired pneu-
monia, we have found that hospitalists are more likely than traditional 
internists to follow guidelines for the appropriate timing of discharge 
relative to clinical stability, reducing the length of stay by discharging 
more people at the time of clinical stability rather than later, and, at the 
same time, discharging fewer patients before they are clinically stable. 
In the language of economists, these doctors are operating closer to the 
production possibility frontier. 
Moreover, recent research by myself and others suggests that these 
doctors appear not only to improve the cost and outcomes of the patients 
they care for, but also to improve the care provided by the other doctors 
with whom they work, whether they are young doctors in training or 
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great example of this is work that we have done examining the adoption 
of low-molecular-weight heparin, a blood thinner used to stabilize and 
dissolve dangerous blood clots that used to require hospitalization of a 
week or more and now are often treated with this new drug in an over-
night hospital stay. At our hospital, the use of this drug began with one 
of our hospitalists, who saw an opportunity to reduce length of stay and 
costs for our hospital, while providing care that was as good or better for 
his patients than the conventional care. Seeing that his job as a hospitalist 
called for him to seek out and implement changes such as these, he worked 
out the logistics of using this treatment at our institution and began to 
use it. But the story did not end there; soon the interns and residents with 
whom he had used the drug began to use it for the patients who appeared 
on their service the following month with a new attending physician, 
and these physicians in turn began to use it and teach it to other interns, 
residents, and attending physicians. Our data allow us to trace out this 
learning from person to person until about two or three years later, when 
the treatment became standard in our hospital. We have also found that 
the hospitalists make the whole system run more efﬁciently by addressing 
systems problems they see, and probably by encouraging physicians who 
are not as effective in the inpatient setting to direct their activities else-
where. Hospitalists are also having increasing effects outside of internal 
medicine, in both subspecialty and co-management models, for example, 
in providing hospital care for post-operative orthopedic patients. The 
aggregate cost implications of these effects are not small. If hospital care 
represents 40 percent of health care expenditures, and if hospitalists can 
reduce hospital spending by 10 percent, then we are talking about sav-
ing potentially 4 percent of health care expenditures, or in Fed terms, 
one-half percent of GDP. For the United States, that would be $60 billion 
annually. For General Electric’s $3 billion annual health care bill, maybe 
$120 million per year. Even if the actual savings were a fraction of these, 
the savings from hospitalists could clearly be substantial. 
But my point is not to tell you that hospitalists are a cure-all. In fact, 
I am known by people who study hospitalists as somewhat of a skeptic, 
but I think the example is important because several lessons emerge from 
it. First, doctors can respond to incentives, even when they are some-
what indirect. The pay of our hospitalist who pioneered the use of low- 
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molecular-weight heparin was not directly tied to saving the hospital 
money, but he had an understanding that, as someone supported by the 
hospital as a hospitalist, his role included the general responsibility to 
contain costs. Note that this understanding contrasts with that of typical 
medical school doctors, who report to their division chiefs, department 
chairs, and deans, most of whom care little whether the hospital runs 
efﬁciently. While, in principle, the hospital vice president in charge of 
utilization could have told the hospital president to tell the dean to tell 
the medical department chair to tell the division chief to tell the attending 
physician to try to think up ways to save money and then thank him or 
her for successful innovation, it goes without saying that such complex 
transmissions of incentives rarely happen, if for no other reason than 
because of the sheer number of links in the chain. The scope for misun-
derstanding and information loss is compounded by the complexity and 
dynamic changes in the links when leaders frequently stay in their jobs 
for only a few years in modern medicine.
The particulars aside, the point here is that doctors can respond to 
incentives, but that the complexity of medical institutions often makes it 
very, very difﬁcult to ensure that such responses occur in a timely fashion. 
In hospital care, I think it is telling that since the establishment of the 
Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) more than 20 years ago, the 
incentives have been aligned for more efﬁcient care for the vast majority 
of hospitalized patients, but only now are we seeing medical specialties 
like hospital medicine arising that make it their business to address the 
inefﬁciencies of hospital care. If you go to the hospital medicine meet-
ings, I think you will be excited to see sessions on quality improvement 
methods, such as process mapping, measuring outcomes, the use of new 
technologies to improve efﬁciency, and so on. Doctors who attend these 
sessions are gaining the skills needed to respond to the incentives that 
have been created. This is all great, and it gives me faith that this is a 
discipline that will grow to make real contributions to improving the cost 
and outcomes of the health care system, but I think it is well worth not-
ing that it is arising 20 years after the fundamental change in incentives 
created by Medicare prospective payment, which I believe, more than 
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So, to me, the lesson here is that it is not enough to change incentives 
alone unless we are prepared to wait a very, very long time for a response. 
We also need to create the institutional environment to be sure that the 
incentives are transmitted to the persons who are in a position to act on 
them, and provide these persons with the skills needed to respond to them. 
I think this problem is perhaps most evident in academic medical centers, 
but it is also present in most community hospitals. Alain Enthoven’s inte-
grated health systems have been leaders in these approaches, so perhaps 
those who have been keeping score should have given him credit for that. 
However, I think that fully integrated systems may not be required. I 
believe that if hospitals were more frequently managed by leaders who 
understood how to create the partnerships needed between hospitals and 
physicians, and that if physicians were trained from their earliest days 
in the skills needed to accomplish the changes in the system required 
to improve health care, we would not have had to wait 20 years after 
PPS to see these changes taking place. The point is that the creation of 
new incentives needs management, and there is a critical dearth of quali-
ﬁed leaders to manage health care intelligently in this country. If we had 
implemented PPS and had trained hospitals and doctors more actively 
in how best to respond to these new incentives, I suspect that we would 
have achieved greater savings and better outcomes, and we would have 
developed disciplines like hospital medicine far sooner than we did. If 
one is a theoretically oriented economist, one can tell stories about why 
it would have made sense for hospitals to invest in producing these skills 
in their physician leaders 20 years ago, but the fact is that they did not, 
and still do so reluctantly. One reason may be that these skills are largely 
general human capital, which employers are understandably reluctant to 
invest in; and for physicians, these are not skills that one easily learns in 
the classroom or that are so trivially mobile across institutions as to be 
worth investing in themselves.
But, regardless, the point is that we could have done, and can do, much 
more to spread skills in system change—skills like root-cause analysis, 
failure mode-effect analysis, continuous quality improvement, process 
mapping, and so on. If a challenge of pay for performance (P4P) based on 
outcomes is patient selection, so that P4P based on structural or process 
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measures of care makes sense, why not help pay for physician training in 
quality improvement and for physician time allocated to quality improve-
ment efforts? Rather than waiting 20 years for the forces of the invisible 
hand created through managed competition to nudge hospitals and phy-
sicians towards efﬁcient practices, it seems to me better in working with 
institutions as complex as those in health care to manage the response to 
incentives more directly. I think the best plan for health care reform can-
not be determined from an elevation of 30,000 feet, and economists have 
had less impact than they might have had because they have too rarely 
thought about how the incentives that they propose play out at the micro 
level. I think that we need to learn not only to create incentives, but also 
to manage them by creating needed co-interventions, such as physician 
training, so that their impact is realized more effectively. 
The second area I wish to discuss, ambulatory care, also illustrates well 
the importance of economists’ not thinking they can understand, no less 
re-engineer, the health care system from 30,000 feet, but instead investing 
more effort in this sort of managed incentivization. Discussing ambula-
tory care is an interesting complement to the discussion of hospital care, 
because unlike hospital care, which is largely paid for by payers, ambula-
tory care often has substantial out-of-pocket components that have been 
created to control utilization.
If any single area has been the focus of health economists, it is the 
effect of co-payments on the demand for medical care, but I think our 
conceptual model of how co-payments affect demand remain tremen-
dously primitive. The model essentially is that we vary the price of some 
aspect of health care, and people decide whether it is worthwhile at that 
price and make their decisions accordingly, based on a comparison of 
beneﬁts to costs. But this is not how health care works, and especially if 
you are not someone who is wealthy and therefore indifferent to costs or 
are not educated enough to inform yourself. Basically, you get 10 to 20 
minutes with your doctor, who talks with you brieﬂy about your health 
concerns and then tells you what to do and sends you on your way. There 
is no time to ask many questions about the magnitude of beneﬁts or 
about alternatives, even if you were self-possessed enough to do so; and 
if you did ask about cost, it is not clear the physician would know the 
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In an article that colleagues and I recently published in the Journal of 
the American Medical Association (JAMA), we found that about three-
quarters of doctors and patients agreed that they should discuss out-of-
pocket costs, but two-thirds of doctors and 85 percent of patients said 
they had never discussed out-of-pocket costs with each other (Alexander, 
Casalino, and Meltzer 2003). With such statistics, I am frankly amazed 
that a price elasticity of demand for care is even measurable in health 
care. But more pragmatically, I cannot help but think that the elasticity 
of demand would be much different if we could shift the culture to put 
issues of cost on the table in the encounter between doctors and patients. 
There are many ways to do this: empowering patients, simplifying beneﬁt 
structures to be more transparent, and educating or incentivizing doctors 
to discuss these issues with their patients. How can we expect co-pay-
ments to have their full effect on demand if people do not even know 
about them at the time they are making the decision to go ahead? We get 
all the ﬁnancial risk that comes with incomplete coverage, while failing to 
realize the potential to constrain expenditures appropriately.
Again, as economists we have worked at 30,000 feet and have not 
managed the human relationships around the incentives that we have 
created. The ﬁelds of psychology, sociology, communication, marketing, 
and graphic design, as well as human factors, can all contribute here. 
And perhaps we need the attention of medical educators and even some 
legislation to ensure that doctors act with basic economic competence 
in discussing issues of cost with their patients. To me, this sort of atten-
tion to the institutional and interpersonal context by which incentives are 
transmitted is the frontier of health economics. 
Concluding, I think that health economics needs to move from merely 
creating incentives to considering how to manage those incentives in 
the context of the complexities of health care. Whether it is by help-
ing doctors and hospitals gain the skills they need to respond effectively 
to prospective payment incentives or by providing patients and doctors 
with the skills they need to manage out-of-pocket costs, we need to think 
about how incentives are complemented by noneconomic approaches, 
such as educating and motivating patients and providers to make changes 
in response to those incentives. In that regard, it is exciting that so many 
economists here work in interdisciplinary settings or have developed link-
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ages with one or more provider systems. But I think that there is still a 
great deal of unexploited opportunity to improve health care by bringing 
interdisciplinary insights into mainstream health economics, and I imag-
ine a conference like this even 10 years from now would ﬁnd people from 
an even broader set of disciplines than the diverse set we see here today.
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tion 290: 953–958.Comments on Altman’s “Will the United 
States Continue to Allocate a Growing  
Proportion of Its GDP to Health Care?”
Joseph P. Newhouse
Stuart Altman covers a lot of ground in his paper, and it would be easy to 
be equally lengthy in commenting on it. But I will limit my comments to 
three topics: (1) the medical cost paradox, namely, that the increment in 
beneﬁts from increased medical care spending over time has exceeded the 
increment in cost, even though at a point in time the marginal beneﬁt of 
additional spending is less than the marginal cost; (2) the consequences 
of increasing medical care cost for the ﬁnancing of Medicare, Medicaid, 
and the safety net; and (3) the consequences of the increasing cost for 
employment-based health insurance.
The Medical Cost Paradox
Altman points out that physicians who are reimbursed on a fee-for-ser-
vice basis, as most American physicians are, have a ﬁnancial incentive to 
deliver all or almost all services with a positive marginal beneﬁt. Medical 
training and culture reinforce this. So do insured patients, who want all 
services that they believe have a positive marginal beneﬁt. In short, the 
ﬁnancial incentives suggest that the marginal dollar spent on medical care 
should not buy very much.
There is much evidence to support this suggestion. Within the United 
States, Altman points to the studies of Elliott Fisher, Jack Wennberg, and 
their colleagues at Dartmouth Medical School. The Dartmouth group has 
made a strong case that high spending areas in the United States receive 
little or nothing in the way of observable beneﬁt from their extra spend-
ing (Dartmouth Medical School 1999; Fisher et al. 2003a, 2003b).
Reforming Options: Matching the Tools with the Goals 258
Reinforcing the notion that the United States does not get value for the 
money it spends are the numerous studies of deﬁciencies in the quality of 
care. They suggest that the American medical care system—and probably 
every other country’s as well—operates well within the frontier of what 
is possible, given the resources it uses (Institute of Medicine 1999, 2001; 
McGlynn et al. 2003; Newhouse 2002).
At the same time, David Cutler, Mark McClellan, and I have made the 
case that the increase in medical spending over time has brought beneﬁts 
that have exceeded the cost (Cutler 2004; Cutler, McClellan, and New-
house 1999; Cutler and McClellan 2001; Newhouse 1992). Cutler has 
argued, persuasively in my view, that the beneﬁts from improvements 
in the treatment of cardiovascular disease and neonatal mortality alone 
have been worth the entire increase in cost in the United States over the 
past few decades (Cutler 2004). In the case of cardiovascular disease, 
however, these gains appear attributable more to relatively inexpensive, 
low-tech treatment than to the well-known, high-tech, costly interven-
tions such as bypass surgery and angioplasty (Cutler, McClellan, and 
Newhouse 1999).
Consistent with the view that, on average, the beneﬁts of the increased 
share of resources going to medical care have been worth their cost is 
the similarity of the rate of real increase in medical cost across developed 
countries, despite those countries’ varied ﬁnancing institutions (New-
house 1992). My interpretation is that all countries have found the costly 
new capabilities of medicine worth purchasing.
In sum, the last several decades have seen valuable but costly medical 
advances. Although no one can know the degree to which these advances 
will continue, it seems likely that they will, and that medical spending 
will continue to rise. As each country spends more, the strains on ﬁnanc-
ing institutions will be ubiquitous, although the nature of those strains 
will differ, depending on the speciﬁcs of each country’s institutions.
The Strains on Public Financing of U.S. Medical Care
Virtually all observers believe the cost of medical care will continue to 
increase. As Altman points out, how Medicare will ﬁnance its share of 
the increasing cost is a major public policy issue. And it is not just Medi-
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the cost of direct delivery systems ﬁnanced by all levels of government. 
These include the Veterans Administration, the military health care sys-
tem, and community health centers at the federal level, as well as state 
and local hospitals at lower levels of government. In FY 2006, medical 
care will account for around 25 percent of the federal budget, and Med-
icaid alone will account for over 20 percent of the average state budget 
(Congressional Budget Ofﬁce 2005a; Mann and Pervez 2005).
The potential future rate of cost increase, together with the large bud-
get share already accounted for by medical care, implies a substantial 
shift of resources to medical care in the future. With an assumption about 
the difference between the future growth of medical cost and the future 
growth of GDP, one can estimate just how substantial that shift might be. 
Historically (1960–2002), the annual increase in medical care cost in the 
United States exceeded GDP growth by 2.7 percentage points; the excess 
in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom was 2.5, 1.9, and 1.7 per-
centage points, respectively (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 2004). 
One can, of course, reasonably expect the excess growth to dimin-
ish because the opportunity cost of medical spending will increase as its 
share of GDP increases. As an illustration of the forces at play, if one 
assumes that U.S. medical spending increases by 2.0 percentage points 
above GDP for several decades, less than the historical U.S. rate, the 
increment in medical spending takes almost all of each year’s increment 
in GDP by mid-century (Chernew, Hirth, and Cutler 2003). 
Long before mid-century, however, the seemingly irresistible force of 
medical cost increases may meet something of an immovable object. 
American political institutions have kept the share of GDP taken by fed-
eral revenues remarkably constant. Only three times in the 58 years since 
the end of World War II have federal revenues as a share of GDP gone 
outside a band of 16 to 20 percent, and only once—in 2000, when rev-
enues swelled from taxes on realized capital gains and exercised stock 
options did the share exceed 20 percent (Congressional Budget Ofﬁce 
2005b). 
How strong a force will act on the apparent ceiling on the federal share 
of GDP? If access is not to be jeopardized for its beneﬁciaries, Medi-
care costs must increase at close to the same rate as private costs, as 
indeed they have historically (Newhouse 2004). The Medicare Trustees 
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assume that the annual per beneﬁciary cost of Medicare will increase 
by only 1 percentage point more than per capita GDP (The Boards of 
Trustees 2005). Although the historical difference between medical care 
cost growth and GDP growth will likely shrink because of the increased 
opportunity cost, I regard the Trustees’ assumption as decidedly opti-
mistic. It is well below what any developed country, let alone the United 
States, has achieved over a sustained period. Even this optimistic assump-
tion, however, shifts around 3 percentage points of GDP to Medicare 
over the next two decades (Congressional Budget Ofﬁce 2003). But given 
the striking constancy of the federal share of GDP, shifting 3 percentage 
points of that share to Medicare will create strains, not to mention the 
additional resources that Medicaid, including long-term care, and Social 
Security will require over the next few decades.
The Strains on Financing Medical Care Through Employment-Based 
Insurance
Altman characterizes the employment-based system as “crumbling” and 
backs that description with numbers on how employment-based insur-
ance has shrunk over the last few years. 
I agree with Altman that there is likely to be continued shrinking 
because of the pressure placed on cash wages by the steady rise in medi-
cal costs. An example will illustrate: the 2005 premium for my HMO 
policy through Harvard University, which covers my wife and me, is over 
$14,000 per year. Dental insurance brings the total to roughly $16,000. 
An employer paying 75 percent of these costs would spend $12,000.
Consider an employee with such a policy, earning $35,000 of cash 
wages. The employer share of Old Age Survivors and Disability Insur-
ance, Hospital Insurance (Medicare Part A), and Unemployment Insur-
ance taxes is 8.5 percent of earnings, or $3,400 for this worker. Suppose 
the employer also makes a 6 percent pension plan contribution, an addi-
tional $2,400. The employer’s share of the fringe cost, including health 
insurance, comes to $17,800 (= $12,000 + $3,400 + $2,400), just over 
half of cash wages; so total compensation is $52,800. 
Now project these numbers forward. Suppose medical care costs go 
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up 3 percent. Assume that the tax rate for Medicare and Social Security 
does not increase, surely an optimistic assumption, and that the pension 
contribution remains at 6 percent. In 10 years, the total compensation of 
$52,800 will have grown to $70,959. The health insurance subsidy, how-
ever, will have more than doubled to $25,907. As a result, cash wages 
will have only risen to $36,065, or 0.3 percent per year. Modest changes 
in these numbers, including considering a lower-wage worker, yield a 
projection that cash wages would fall. 
Thus, the pressure on cash wages creates special problems for low-wage 
workers. At the extreme of the minimum wage, the employer cannot shift 
the increases in insurance premiums. But as the foregoing example shows, 
shifting costs may run into problems well above the minimum wage if the 
employer does not wish to cut nominal wages. This is especially the case 
when increases in health care costs substantially outrun general inﬂation 
(Sommers 2005).
If costs cannot be fully shifted to low-wage workers, the employer 
can increase cost sharing, reduce covered services, or decrease the pre-
mium subsidy. Clearly, employers are utilizing all of these strategies. And 
sufﬁcient decreases in the premium subsidy could effectively negate the 
risk pooling that the ﬁrm provides, as good risks opt out; that is, such 
decreases in the subsidy could effectively wipe out employment-based 
insurance. 
Another option for the employer is to redistribute more within the 
workgroup; that is, to have high-wage workers subsidize low-wage work-
ers to a greater degree. But this disadvantages employers with a relatively 
high share of low-wage workers when competing in the labor market for 
high-wage workers. Rather than redistribute, the employer may contract 
out for services provided by low-wage workers, either to independent 
contractors or to ﬁrms that hire low-wage workers but do not provide 
health insurance. In turn, such workers shift to a spouse’s insurance, to 
the individual insurance market, or to safety-net institutions. The lat-
ter development, of course, places further stress on public budgets and 
increases the political pressure for universal coverage. 
Ironically, increases in the minimum wage exacerbate the problem. 
Colin Baker has shown that about half of the 4 percentage point decline 
in those insured through their employer during the 1987–1999 period 
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was attributable to increases in the minimum wage, especially the $1.80 
increase in the federal minimum wage (Baker 2005). And an employer’s 
pulling insurance off the table entirely is clearly the extreme case; most 
likely many more employers increased the cost sharing, decreased cov-
ered services, decreased the subsidy to the premium, or used some combi-
nation of these approaches in response to the minimum wage increase.
Will the Cost Increases Continue?
No one can say with any assurance what the increase in future medical 
costs will be, but the cost of medical care has been increasing faster than 
GDP for more than half a century in virtually every developed country, 
at least if one looks at sufﬁciently long time periods. The principal driver 
behind this increase has been the increased capabilities of medicine. It 
seems only reasonable to think that these capabilities will continue to 
increase, because many of them are highly valued. Still, as the opportunity 
cost increases, it also seems reasonable to think that the rate of increase 
will slow down. Just how fast it will slow down and how the ﬁnancing 
institutions will accommodate to the increase is anyone’s guess. But the 
safest bet would be for continued strain on ﬁnancing institutions.
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